Female Ministers, Governance and Reforms by Tom Coupe
`                   
Kyiv School of Economics and Kyiv Economics Institute 
 Yakira St. 13, 3d floor, 04119 Kyiv, Ukraine 
Phone: (+380 44) 492-8012, Fax: (+380 44) 492-8011 
E-mail: info@kse.org.ua, Internet: www.kse.org.ua 
                  
 






Female Ministers, Governance and Reforms 
 
Tom Coupé   

















Female Ministers, Governance and Reforms 
 
Abstract: 
In this paper, we test whether the gender composition of government affects the quality of 
governance and reform efforts, thus connecting the literature that documents the effects of 
gender on decision making to the literature on the determinants of reforms. We find that 
countries with a higher share of female ministers and a higher share of female MPs tend to score 
somewhat better in terms of regulatory quality and government effectiveness, and in terms of 
reforms in these areas, but also that tackling possible endogeneity shows most of these effects to 
be insignificant. Our results thus do not provide support for the claim that ‘conducting reforms is 
not women’s business’, they rather suggest that reform is as much women’s business as it is 
men’s business.   
 
 








On March 19 2010, the Ukrainian Prime Minister Azarov explained the absence of women in 
Ukraine’s new government by the need to pursue reforms, indicating that ‘conducting reforms is 
not women’s business’. Prime Minister Azarov’s statement made headlines internationally (see 
for example, Kaminska (2010) in the Financial Times and Harding (2010) in The Guardian) and 
caused a wave of protest both inside and outside Ukraine. In this paper, we provide an empirical 
test of this claim by studying the link between the governance and reform efforts of 
governments, and their gender composition. 
Several academic studies have already documented the effect of gender on decision making.  A 
first strand of this literature has focused on how the gender of CEOs or the gender composition 
of boards affects the performance and behavior of firms. Muravyev et al (2009), for example, 
find that firms headed by a female manager are less likely to receive bank loans, which can 
explain why female-headed firms are typically less leveraged. Adams and Fereira (2008) find 
that female board members are more involved in monitoring firms but can hamper firms’ 
performance. A second strand of this literature focuses on state governance, investigating 
whether countries with higher female political participation, in government or in the electorate, 
allocate more to ‘social’ expenditures (Atchison and Down, 2009, Burton and Seiferling, 2009) 
or are less corrupt (Dollar et al, 2001, Sung, 2003). In a study on how the gender of Village 
Council heads affects policy outcomes, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) show that leaders tend 
to favor investments in infrastructure which are directly relevant to the needs of their own 
gender. Finally, Krogstrup and Walti (2009) provide a median voter model that supports such 
gender effects: they show how adding risk averse women to the electorate will reduce budget 
deficits.  
There is also a sizeable literature on the determinants of reforms. Amin and Djankov (2009a) and 
Guiliano et al (2009) for example, focus on the role of democracy while Amin and Djankov 
(2009b) focus on the role of natural resources. Campos and Horvath (2006) focus on 
determinants of reforms in transition countries and Lora and Olivera (2004) focus on Latin 
America. Most of these studies use country characteristics, rather than characteristics of the 
political leadership, to explain why some countries reform and others do not. An exception is 3 
 
Dreher et al (2009) whom focus on how the education and profession of heads of government 
affects the implementation of reforms
1. 
As far as we know, neither the studies that focus on the determinants of reforms nor the studies 
that focus on how gender affects decision making, have studied the link between the political 
representation of women in the government, and the quality of governance and reforms. Several 
studies, however, have found that women, on average, are less supportive of reforms. For 
example, Firebough and Sandu (1998) found that Romanian men were more likely to support 
marketization and democratization while Hayo (2004) found that women throughout Eastern 
Europe were less in favor of creating a market economy (see also Miller et al, 1994). 
Explanations that have been offered for these gender differences, range from gender-specific 
levels of risk averseness (see for example, Corson and Gneezy, 2009, for a review of the 
experimental evidence), to gender-specific impacts of reform (for example, Hayo (2004) offers 
as a possible explanation, that women in transition countries were hit disproportionally by the 
reduction in state-provided child care. Tsikata and Kerr (2000) focus on the gender specific 
impact of reforms in Africa).   
Of course, even if women are, on average, less pro-reform, this does not necessarily mean that 
women in the government will make reform more difficult:  assuming one can observe a 
person’s intentions to reform, those forming the government can choose pro-reform female 
ministers, as there are plenty of pro-reform women, even if, on average, women are less pro-
reform. Our study will shed light on this issue by regressing measures of quality of governance 
and changes in such quality (i.e. reforms) on the gender composition of governments. 
Data and Methodology 
Data about governance and reforms come from the World Bank’s Governance Indicators 
(Kaufmann et al., 2009). These indicators, which are composite indicators based on various 
sources, focus on 6 areas of governance. In this study we focus on ‘regulatory quality’ and 
‘government effectiveness’. The ‘regulatory quality’ indicator aims at ‘capturing perceptions of 




permit and promote private sector development’. While the ‘government effectiveness’ aims at 
‘capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies’. We focus 
on these 2 indicators as both are linked explicitly to government policies. ‘Reforms’ thus can be 
defined as changes in ‘regulatory quality’ and changes in ‘government effectiveness’. 
The WB’s governance indicators are available for 1996, 1998, 2000 and annually between 2002 
and 2008, and give, for about 200 countries, a standardized score, which is comparable across 
years and countries.  
Data on the percentage of women in ministerial positions come from various issues of the 
Human Development Report and the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Definitions vary slightly – an 
appendix gives the exact definitions and sources. Data are typically recorded at the beginning of 
the year. Data are available for 1995, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2008. 
Because we have data at irregular intervals and because implementing reforms requires time, we 
focus on 2 types of dependent variables. In a first regression (1), we use the average quality of 
governance over the period 1996-2008, thus focusing on the level of governance. To compute 
these averages for a given variable, we use the years for which we have data for that variable. In 













Our control variables cover the typical determinants of reforms and governance used in the 
literature. We include 
•  Indicators for the political regime, testing the hypothesis that democracy is good or bad 
for reforms and governance. We use the polity2 indicator from the Polity IV dataset, 
which scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). 5 
 
•  Indicators for the level of economic development, testing whether rich countries have 
better governance and an easier time to reform than poor countries. We use GDP data 
from the online World Bank databank. 
•  Indicators for fractionalization of the population, testing whether fragmented societies 
have worse governance and a more difficult time to agree on reforms. We use the 1985 
level of ethno-linguistic fractionalization of Roeder (2001). 
•  Indicators for ‘crisis’ situations, testing the idea that countries will react to a crisis by 
reforming. This can be captured by the lowest GDP growth in a given period. We use 
GDP growth data from the online World Bank databank. 
•  Indicators of previous reforms, testing whether previous reforms are often followed by 
more reforms. We capture this in the reform regressions by including the level of 
regulatory quality/government effectiveness at the start of the period. 
We then address two possible concerns. First, one could argue that representation of women in 
government does not only happen through female ministers but also through female Members of 
Parliament (MPs). Using data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union
2, we therefore include the 
average share of female MPs over the period 1996-2008 as an additional explanatory variable. 
As before, to compute this average, we use the years for which data are available for a given 
country. 
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Second, we address possible endogeneity concerns in two ways. First we instrument the average 
share of female ministers and the average share of female MPs by the number of years women 
have had the right to vote at the beginning of the period under consideration (that is, in 1996
3) 
and by a dummy reflecting whether or not a women had presided the House of Representatives 
by that time. Our assumption is that, ceteris paribus, the longer women have had the right to vote 
the more they will be represented in the cabinet of ministers and in the Parliament. Similarly, a 





serve as a signal for women that becoming a minister or an MP is a reachable goal, thus 
increasing the supply of women interested in government positions. At the same time, there is no 
reason to expect that either of these variables should affect current reform efforts other than 
through the representation of women in the cabinet of ministers.  
As a second way to address endogeneity, we run a set of regressions that use 1995 values, rather 
than contemporaneous values of the explanatory variables
4.  
Results 
We next turn to the descriptive statistics. Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics of our dependent 
variables. 
Table 1: descriptive statistics of the dependent variables. 
# Average  Std  Min Max 
Avg. Regulatory Quality  141  -0.04  0.94  -2.08  1.85 
Regulatory Quality  Reform  141  0.02  0.68  -2.13  1.86 
Avg. Gov’nment Effectiveness  141  -0.04  0.98  -1.74  2.29 
Gov’nment  Effectiveness  Reform  141 -0.04 0.42 -1.40 1.03 
 
As one can see, the average Regulatory Quality variable and the average Government 
Effectiveness variable are standardized variables, hence the (approximately) zero average and the 
(approximately) unit standard deviation. The standard deviation of the reform variables is less 
than one but is still substantial. 
Table 2 focuses on the explanatory variables. In 1995, the average proportion of female ministers 
was low, at about 7%. Over time, female representation in the cabinet of ministers increased, 
bringing the average over the period to 12.5%. The average share of women among MPs is 
similar at 13.6% and, by 1996, women had had, on average, about 50 years the right to vote. 






Table 2: descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables. 
# Average Std  Min  Max 
Average share of Female Ministers  141  12.5  8.4  0  47.4 
Share of female ministers in 1995  137  7.2  8.0  0  47.8 
Average share of female MPs  141  13.6  8.8  0  43.96 
# years women have right to vote at beginning of 1996 138  50.7  20.5  0  103 
Log Average Per Capita GDP  141  7.6  1.6  4.7  10.6 
Log Per Capita GDP in 1995  139  7.35  1.61  4.1  10.5 
Lowest GDP Growth  141  -7.05  10.9  -51  5 
Average Polity2 Index  141  3.33  6.28  -10  10 
Polity2 Index in 1995  140  2.72  6.79  -10  10 
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization  141  0.46  0.27  0  0.95 
Initial Regulatory Quality  141  -0.023 0.96 -3.13  1.66 
Initial Government Effectiveness  141 -0.013 1.00  -1.78  2.64 
 
To get a first feel of the relations between our main variables of interest, we graph two scatter 
plots. A first scatter plot graphs the average percentage of female ministers between 1996 and 
2008 against the average regulatory quality in this period. The correlation between these 
variables is strongly positive (0.45), indicating that countries with a high percentage of female 
ministers are typically also countries with relatively high regulatory quality. At the same time, 
the graph also shows that even with little or no female ministers one can score high on regulatory 
quality (like Singapore or Hong Kong) but also that no country with more than 26% female 
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The second scatter plot graphs the average percentage of female ministers between 1996 and 
2008 against the change in regulatory quality between these 2 years. There is a positive 
correlation between these two variables (0.17) if anything, suggesting that reforms are positively 
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Using government effectiveness instead of regulatory quality does not change the results much – 
the correlation of the average level of female ministers with the average level of our governance 
indicators is substantial at 0.49, while the correlation with reforms is much smaller, and even 
slightly negative at -0.05. 
Of course, the above graphs and correlations do not control for any other variables that might 
affect (changes in) regulatory quality or government effectiveness. 
We therefore next run regressions that correspond to the above graphs and correlations but 
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Avg. Share of 
Female Ministers  0.014** 0.011*  0.024***  0.002 
(2.60) (1.96)  (5.30)  (0.49) 
Log Avg. Per 
Capita GDP  0.373*** 0.286***  0.442***  0.180*** 
(11.37) (7.41)  (12.83)  (5.05) 
Avg. Polity2  0.044***  0.026***  0.023***  0.013** 
(4.78) (2.65)  (2.90)  (2.19) 
Ethno-Ling. 
Fractional.  0.002 -0.146  0.003  0.032 
(0.01) (-1.02)  (0.02)  (0.24) 
Lowest GDP 
Growth   -0.011**    -0.007** 
(-2.57) (-2.18) 
Initial 
Regulatory Quality    -0.633***    
(-7.89) 
Initial Gov’nment  
Effectiveness       -0.356*** 
(-5.62) 
constant -3.185***  -2.397***  -3.759***  -1.544*** 
(-13.70) (-8.07)  (-14.14)  (-5.03) 
Adjusted R
2 0.744  0.497  0.786 0.271 
N 141  141  141  141 
OLS regressions. T-statistics are in parenthesis. Robust standard errors are used. * corresponds to 10% significance level, ** to 
5% and *** to 1%. 
Column one regresses the average Regulatory Quality on the average percentage of female 
ministers in the government, the logarithm of the average GDP per capita (in constant US$), the 
average level of the polity2 index and the level of ethno-linguistic fractionalization. All variables 
are averages over the period 1996-2008, with the exception of the last variable which is 
measured in 1985
5. We find a positive effect of GDP, indicating that richer countries are the 
countries with a higher regulatory quality, and of the level of democracy as measured by the 




As far as our main variable of interest is concerned, we find that having a higher percentage of 
women in the government goes together with having a higher level of regulatory quality. In our 
sample, the average percentage of women varies between zero and 47 percent, with an average 
of 12 and a standard deviation of 8. Ceteris paribus, and if one is willing to assuming causality, 
an increase of the average percentage of women in the government by 8 percent (one standard 
deviation) would increase the regulatory quality by 0.112 or one-tenth of a standard deviation of 
regulatory quality. Hence, the effect is fairly limited. We also experimented with a quadratic 
term to check whether there is a non-linear effect in the presence of women in the government 
but did not find evidence in favor of this. Overall, this result suggests that, at current levels of 
female representation in the government, increasing the percentage of women further would 
improve regulatory quality. 
Next, we focus on reforms, i.e. changes in regulatory quality rather than levels of regulatory 
quality. In column 2, we therefore regress the change in regulatory quality between 1996 and 
2008 on the same set of explanatory variables plus an indicator of crisis, i.e. the lowest level of 
GDP during this period, and the initial level of regulatory quality in 1996. Results remain largely 
unaffected: higher GDP and more democracy go together with more regulatory quality, as is 
having more female ministers. The effect of female ministers is even smaller, however, and less 
significant. Additional findings are that having a growth crisis stimulates reforms and that better 
regulated countries reform less. 
Columns 3 and 4 present the results of similar regressions, using the government effectiveness 
indicator and the change therein, as the dependent variable. The results for the control variables 
are qualitatively similar, though the included variables explain less of the variation of the 
reforms in government effectiveness. As far as our main variable of interest is concerned, having 
a higher percentage of women in the government also goes together with having a significantly 
higher level of government effectiveness, though the positive effect on changes in government 
effectiveness is insignificant. 
Next, we add the average share of female MPs over the period 1996-2008 as an additional 
explanatory variable which measures a second way women are represented in the policy arena. 12 
 











Avg. Share of Female 
Ministers  0.013 0.009  0.012*  -0.004 
(1.61) (0.99) (1.71) (-0.74) 
Avg. Share of Female 
MPs  0.002 0.002  0.015**  0.009 
(0.22) (0.26) (2.39) (1.59) 
Log Avg. Per Capita GDP  0.372***  0.285***  0.435***  0.182*** 
(11.41) (7.37) (13.58) (5.10) 
Avg.  Polity2  0.045*** 0.026*** 0.025***  0.015** 
(4.78) (2.64) (3.17) (2.42) 
Ethno-Ling. Fractional.  0.002  -0.146  0.005  0.03 
(0.01) (-1.03) (0.03) (0.24) 
Lowest GDP Growth  -0.011**  -0.007** 
(-2.57) (-2.19) 
Initial 
Regulatory Quality    -0.633***    
(-7.84) 
Initial Gov’nment 
Effectiveness       -0.374*** 
(-5.74) 
constant  -3.186*** -2.396*** -3.773*** -1.601*** 
(-13.71) (-8.09) (-15.20) (-5.20) 
Adjusted R
2  0.742 0.494 0.794 0.284 
N  141 141 141 141 
OLS regressions. T-statistics are in parenthesis. Robust standard errors are used. * corresponds to 10% significance level, ** to 
5% and *** to 1%. 
The average share of female MPs is quite highly correlated (0.7) to the average share of female 
ministers, so it is not surprising that the significance levels of the average share of female 
ministers somewhat decreases. Still, the average share of female ministers remains significantly 
positive at the 11% level for regulatory quality and at the 9% level for the government 
effectiveness indicator. But it is no longer significant for reforms in either of these areas. Instead 
the share of female MPs is found to correlate with the level and, to some extent, the change in 
government effectiveness but not with the level or change in regulatory quality. 13 
 
Next we use the number of years women have had the right to vote and a dummy reflecting 
whether or not a woman presided over the House of Representatives by 1996, as instruments for 
the average share of female ministers and the average share of female MPs. The instruments are 
fairly strongly correlated with the variables they instrument (correlations between 0.3 and 0.4) 
and are both significantly positive, at 5% significance or less, when the average share variables 
are regressed on the instruments and the other explanatory variables in the first stage of the IV 
regression. 











Avg. Share of Female 
Ministers  -0.048 -0.062 -0.118 -0.005 
(-0.58) (-0.55) (-0.93) (-0.10) 
Avg. Share of Female 
MPs  0.043 0.055 0.108  0.01 
(0.65) (0.67) (1.15) (0.25) 
Log Avg. Per Capita GDP  0.381***  0.273***  0.448***  0.182*** 
(9.62) (5.30) (7.86) (4.77) 
Avg. Polity2  0.068**  0.05  0.073  0.015 
(2.30) (1.26) (1.56) (0.83) 
Ethno-Ling. Fractional.  0.037  -0.118  0.075  0.031 
(0.21) (-0.63) (0.29) (0.24) 
Lowest GDP Growth  -0.009  -0.007* 
(-1.45) (-1.71) 
Initial 
Regulatory Quality    -0.592***    
(-6.20) 
Initial Gov’nment 
Effectiveness       -0.375*** 
(-4.40) 
constant  -3.149*** -2.212*** -3.709*** -1.603*** 
(-12.73) (-5.08)  (-8.84)  (-4.32) 
Adjusted R
2  0.613 0.143 0.243 0.284 
N  141 141 141 141 
IV regressions. T-statistics are in parenthesis. Robust standard errors are used. * corresponds to 10% significance level, ** to 5% 
and *** to 1%. 14 
 
Instrumenting our variables of interest turns their coefficients insignificant, suggesting there is 
no causal influence of the representation of women in power on regulatory quality or government 
effectiveness, nor on reforms. The opposite signs and similarity of size of the two variables, 
combined with the fact that the variables that were instrumented were fairly highly correlated 
suggests the presence of multicollinearity. However, when dropping either the share of female 
MPs or the share of female ministers from the instrumental variables regression, the included 
variable of interest (which then captures the effect of both), though always positive, remains 
insignificant, confirming our conclusion that no causal effect can be found in our sample.   As an 
alternative way to tackle endogeneity, we next regress our dependent variables on the initial 
values of our explanatory variables.   











Share of Female Ministers 
1995  0.012 0.015  0.018**  0.006 
(1.54) (1.57) (2.12) (0.91) 
Share of Female MPs 1995  0.003  -0.001  0.011  0 
(0.35) (-0.07) (1.40) (-0.00) 
Log Per Capita GDP 1995  0.367***  0.253***  0.436***  0.157*** 
(11.53) (6.19) (11.63) (4.33) 
Polity2 1995  0.039***  0.025***  0.019**  0.010* 
(4.83) (3.04) (2.52) (1.67) 
Ethno-Ling. Fractional.  -0.052  -0.18  -0.097  -0.079 
(-0.31) (-1.11) (-0.61) (-0.55) 
Lowest GDP Growth  -0.016***  -0.009*** 
(-3.46) (-2.67) 
Initial 
Regulatory Quality    -0.586***    
(-6.77) 
Initial Gov’nment 
Effectiveness       -0.356*** 
(-5.53) 
constant -2.897***  -2.056***  -3.450***  -1.274*** 
(-12.12) (-6.54) (-12.28) (-4.22) 
Adjusted R
2  0.768 0.47 0.814  0.231 
N 123  123  123  123 
OLS regressions. T-statistics are in parenthesis. Robust standard errors are used. * corresponds to 10% significance level, ** to 
5% and *** to 1%. 15 
 
This second way of tackling possible endogeneity leaves a somewhat stronger role for female 
representation in government. The coefficient of the share of female ministers is always positive, 
flirts with significance in two specifications and is one time clearly significant. And the size of 
the effect is similar to what we found in specification (1) and (2). The share of female MPs, 
however, is never found to be significant
6. 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we test whether the gender composition of a government affects the quality of 
governance and the reform efforts of this government, thus contributing to the literature that 
investigates how the participation of women in political life affects policy outcomes and to the 
literature that investigates the determinants of reforms.  
We find that the coefficients on the two indicators of female representation are found to be 
positive in most regressions, suggesting a positive, albeit small, effect on government quality and 
reforms. This effect is more often significant for government quality than for reforms, and when 
including both the share of female ministers and the share of female MPs, the former variable is 
more often significant. When addressing the endogeneity issue however, significance levels of 
both variables drop substantially and in most cases become insignificant. Hence, overall we do 
not find strong evidence that female ministers or female MPs have a positive or negative effect 
on the quality of governance or on reform efforts.  Our results thus do not provide support for the 
claim that ‘conducting reforms is not women’s business’, they rather suggest that reform is as 
much women’s business as it is men’s business.   
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